INTRODUCTION
So much depends upon a rope in Mobile, Alabama. To hang Michael Donald, Henry Hays and James "Tiger" Knowles tied up "a piece of nylon rope about twenty feet long, yellow nylon. "2 They borrowed the rope from Frank Cox, Hays's brother-in-law.3 Cox "went out in the back" of his mother's "boatshed, or something like that, maybe it was in the lodge."4 He "got a rope," climbed into the front seat of Hays's Buick Wildcat, and handed it to Knowles sitting in the back seat.s
So much depends upon a noose. Knowles "mad!! a hangman's noose out of the rope,"6 thirteen loops in the knot, thirteen loops "around" Michael Donald's neck, a "classic hangman's noose."7 A hangman's noose "needs to be cut and burned right ... so it won't unravel."8 Both ends of the rope must be "cut off and burµed."9
In 1983, a Mobile County grand jury indicted Hays, the Exalted Cyclops of the United Klans of America, for capital murder.16 At trial, the jury found Hays guilty and recommended life without pa role.17 The trial judge rejected the recommendation of the jury and sentenced Hays to death. l s
In 1984, a Mobile County grand jury indicted Cox, also a mem ber of the United Klans of America, for conspiracy to commit mur der.19 After impaneling a jury and convening the trial, the trial judge dismissed the indictment and discharged Cox, citing the Ala bama three-year statute of limitations for criminal conspiracy. 2 0 In 1987, an Alabama grand jury reindicted Cox for murder. 2 1 Com menced in 1988, the initial trial of the murder indictment ended in a mistrial. Reconvened in 1989, a second trial resulted in a conviction. 2 2 10. Id In this article, I take up the cause of Henry Hays, James Knowles, and Frank Cox, the cause of the Ku Klux Klan and other agents of racial violence in American history. I come to their cause not out of sympathy but in pursuit of a larger project devoted to the historical study of race, lawyers, and ethics in the American crimi nal justice system. Provoked by the jurisprudence of critical race theory ("CRT"),30 the project investigates the rhetoric of race or "race-talk" in criminal defense advocacy and ethies within the con text of racially motivated private violence.31 The purpose of this long-term project is to understand the status of race, racialized de fense strategy, and race-neutral representation in the law and ethics of criminal defense lawyering. Out of this understanding, I hope, will come a general theory of racialized defenses grounded in the normative ideals of moral community.
In a prior work, I searched the rhetoric of race in cases of ra cially motivated black-on-white private violence by focusing on the 1993 trial of Damian Wi lliams and Henry Watson in Los Angeles County Superior Court on charges of attempted murder and aggra vated mayhem, stemming from the beating of Reginald Denny and seven others during the South Central Los Angeles riots of 1992.3 2 Close inspection of the Williams-Watson trial record suggests that the rhetorical structure of criminal defense stories of black-on white racial violence incorporates competing narratives of deviance and defiance that engraft an essentialist dichotomy of good-bad moral character on the racial identity of young black men. 33 The distillation of male racial identity into objective, universal catego ries of black manhood distorts the meaning of racial identity and the image of racial community.34 Moreover, the tendency of crimi nal defense lawyers to privilege deviance narratives and to subordinate defiance narratives in storytelling magnifies that distor tion, inscribing the mark of bestial pathology into the texture of racial identity and community. The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Model Code of Profes sional Responsibility3s countenance such deformity by allowing racialized or color-coded criminal defense strategies to survive un regulated under neutral accounts of liberal contractarian and com munitarian legal theory.36
Calling for remedial regulation in racialized contexts such as the Williams-Watson trial, I proposed an alternative ethic of profes sional responsibility animated by principles of race consciousness, contingency, and collectivity.37 A strong version of this alternative ethic directs criminal defense lawyers to reject the use of deviance based racialized strategies unless such strategies are necessary to frustrate, by means of jury nullifi cation, a racially discriminatory prosecution.38 A weak version entreats defense lawyers to join 32. See their clients in collaborative deliberation over the meaning of racial identity and injury within a counseling dialogue devoted to moral character and community integrity.39 Unsurprisingly, these remedial prescriptions sparked swift and acute criticism.40 Robin Barnes, for example, denounced the reme dial scheme as unprecedented, unworkable, and likely unconstitu tional.41 Furthermore, she condemned the underlying interpretive analysis of the Williams-Watson trial record for mistakenly entan gling social and legal strands of race-talk, misjudging the harm in flicted upon black racial identity and community, and misconceiving the criminal defense lawyer's duty to advocate on be half of individual client interests, even when preservation of those interests demands the use of racialized narratives.42 For Barnes, the eradication of racial prejudice from the criminal justice system ne cessitates a regime of legal neutrality, not a regime of race-con scious ethics rules.43
Grand intentions notwithstanding, Barnes's dedication to neu trality consigns to folly her campaign aimed at purging the criminal justice system of racial prejudice. In the context of racial violence and racialized legal discourse, neutrality is not merely elusive, it is largely untenable. Broadly or narrowly construed, the color-coded rhetoric of legal discourse affords little chance of or room for neu tral speech on matters of racial significance. Moreover, dedication to neutrality accepts the harms of racial injury as inevitable and, worse, unremarkable. That the harms are suffered by the victims and agents of racial violence, as well as by their cohort communi ties, seems of no moment to Barnes.
The threshold premise of this article, and its allied research, is the recognition and condemnation of racial injury within the dis tinct, though sometimes overlapping, borders of public and private violence. The instant tum to racial rhetoric in the circumstance of white-on-black private violence, specifically in the case of lynching, strains that border distinction. Gauged by any measure, the polit ical violence of lynching seems to override the public-private dis tinction commonly posited by leg _ al advocates and adjudicators. Yet here, tailored carefully to the facts presented in the case of Michael Donald, the distinction seems to hold and, equally important, to prove rhetorically and morally instructive.
The enormous breadth of the subject of lynching in America, spanning two centuries and crossing interdisciplinary boundaries, coupled with a scarcity of archival court collections, especially trial records, dictates a somewhat improvisional initial approach to the rhetoric of lynching cases.44 The starting point, staked out in this introductory article, is an effort to map competing theories of racial ized defenses arising out of lynching prosecutions. Building on this effort, the next article will survey the varied forms of racialized de fenses fashioned against lynching prosecutions. A third article will chart the development of racialized defenses in lynching-related civil rights actions. Together, the articles will lay the groundwork for a fuller account of the history of racialized defenses in Ameri can criminal and civil rights law.
To the extent that it assumes a theory-driven posture toward sociolegal practice, the instant approach will doubtless stir protest. Detecting an "impatience to theorize,"45 some may condemn the approach for privileging abstract theoretical design over contextual ized reflection.46 To be sure, epistemological hierarchy of any sort warrants careful scrutiny. out peril. Although broad, the project advanced here strives for a contextual account of the law of criminal lawyering and ethics in the hope of capturing some sense of the theory and practice of ra cial violence in American legal history.
The article is divided into four parts. Part I describes the narra tive form and racialized substance of lynching defenses. Part II ex amines rival theories of lynching defenses, notably jury nullification, victim denigration, and diminished capacity. Part III analyzes alternative ethical justifications of lynching defenses under modem and postmodern visions of jurisprudence. Part IV proposes a reconstructed ethic of lynching defenses informed by the norms of virtue, citizenship, race consciousness, and spirituality.
I. L YNCHING HISTORIES
The lynching of Michael Donald at the hands of the Ku Klux Klan sounds themes echoed throughout the history of lynching in America: difference, hate, violence, and community.s o Plainly, a full account of that history, and of the place of the Klan in its pro gress,51 exceeds the scope of this article. The main thrust of this article addresses neither the progress nor the prosecution of lynch ing,52 but rather the legal defense of racially motivated violence. Symbolic of the physical and interpretive violence of race, lynching and its legal defense raise issues common to the postmodern study of law and the politics of difference,53 especially the contested poli- tics of the racial trial. 54 The legal defense of lynching, for example, involves the identity-making function of legal narrative,55 the social construction of race,56 and the culture and cognitive psychology of bias.57
The product of an apartheid system of rhetorical and spatial dimensions, the American trial court provides the arena for the in tersection of law, lawyering, ethics, and race. An important litera ture explores the role of judges and courts in the history of racial oppression both here5s and abroad.59 Curiously, this literature omits sustained treatment of the complicity of lawyers in legitimiz ing the juridical structures (such as law, legal discourse, and institu tional procedure) of racial oppression.60
The emergence of an outsider jurisprudence in the legal acad emy during the last decade offers a chance to cure this omission. Guided by new voices of color61 probing the connections of law, race, and identity,62 the jurisprudence is evolving rapidly under the prodding of CRT ,63 Asian,64 and LatCrit scholars. 65 legal practice toward an appreciation of the importance of racial identity and community.
Consider the idea of the racialized defense. By racialized, I mean a defense coded, overtly or covertly, in the rhetoric of color. Garnered from interdisciplinary research on race and the criminal law process,74 judicial reports of racial and ethnic bias in the court room,75 and the writings of CRJ'76 and ethics77 scholars, color coded claims and defenses pervade the sociolegal discourse of American law, culture, and society. The resurgence of the black rage defense78 and the emergence of the variegated cultural de fense79 reflects the protean nature of that discourse. Taken to gether, these defenses illustrate the intertwined character of legal and social discourse about race.
Alluding to this entwined quality, Alan Hunt observes "that legal life and everyday social life are mutually conditioning and constraining and that elements of legal consciousness play an active part in popular consciousness and practices."8 0 To Hunt, law "en ters into the way that life is imagined, discussed, argued about, and fought over."8 1 The act of "imagining, talking, arguing, and fight-ing" in turn "shapes the law."82 In this way, the racialized organiza tion of law, lawyering, and ethics infects and, conversely, is infected by the racialized composition of popular culture and everyday so cial life in America. 83 The fusion of racialized legal and social dis course is not simply confined to high-profile cases.84
The prominence-of the racialized defense in contemporary soci olegal discourse underscores the crucial function of narrative and storytelling in criminal law and lawyering. Dismantling racialized storytelling in a criminal context reveals two core presuppositions that shape the traditional criminal defense paradigm: partisanship and nonaccountability.ss The precepts of client partisanship and moral nonaccountability spawn discrete rhetorical forms of color coded narrative. The play of narrative, Rebecca French notes, "breaks open a discipline by creating new linguistic and representa tional forms."86 Here, the focus is on the racialized criminal court room, its race-neutral ethical precepts, and its color-coded narrative forms.
The examination of racialized courtroom narratives requires an analysis of hierarchy and status in legal rhetoric. Consider the rhet oric of colorblind constitutionalism. The colorblindness trope87 is basic to the discourse of American law and jurisprudence. Yet, in sofar as it denies the social significance of racial categories, it pre-82. Id serves racial hierarchy and status inequality.ss In this respect, colorblind rhetoric operates as a "status-preserving"89 discourse.
The law of lawyering which governs the criminal defense of ra cial violence in lynching cases also constitutes a status-preserving discourse. In practical effect, it protects the racial hierarchy of white dominance and black subordination embedded in the racial ized narratives of American law, culture, and society. Within fed eral and state courtrooms, this status hierarchy appears legitimate and nondiscriminatory.
This legitimacy rests in part on the rhetoric of colorblindness. The reconfiguration of difference-based racial hierarchy re quires alteration of the signifying function ·of lynching defenses. Al teration may be accomplished through either nonreflexive or reflexive approaches to the law of criminal lawyering.93 A nonreflexive, or discretionary, approach draws upon traditions of lawyer independence to disavow racialized strategies. This unilat eral approach conceives of the criminal defense lawyer as an unbri dled moral activist. A reflexive or collaborative approach appeals to civic republican traditions to encourage lawyer-client delibera tions of racial identity, moral character, and dialogic community. This bilateral approach restores the Brandeisian vision of "socially responsible advocacy."94 Both discretionary and collaborative approaches to criminal lawyering reaffirm the bonds that link the criminal law to moral character9s and community. To prevail, however, reaffirm ation must confront the ascending rhetoric of excuse in criminal defense Dan Kahan defines shame in terms of disgrace. Shame, accord ing to Kahan, is "the emotion that a person experiences when she believes that she has been disgraced in the eyes of persons whom she respects. "102 As such, it illuminates the conjunction of culture, community, and the criminal justice system. 103
Lynching defenses encourage cultural and community resistance to shame104 by inviting collective defiance of legal and nonlegal people or communities of color, the defenses incite separation and detachment.
A. Jury Nullification
The racialized defense of jury nullification binds communities to racial diff erence �d subordination. Construed as an expression of community moral sentiment, nullifi cation seeks to rectify perceived inequalities of racial status.107 Out of deference to the subordinate racial status of black jurors and defendants, Paul Butler explains that nullification occurs when a jury harbors objections to a law either on its face or as applied to a particular defendant and, ac cordingly, "disregards evidence presented at trial and acquits an otherwise guilty defendant."1 o s Borrowing Butler's formulation for the purpose of upending it, the theory of jury nullifi cation pro pounded here licenses white jurors to "approach their work cogni zant of its political nature and their prerogative to exercise their power in the best interests " of the white community.10 9
Nullification defense strategies recognize race as a rhetorical presence in criminal jury selection and deliberation.110 Recent literature on the crimin al jury111 confirms the magnitude of this presence. Race taints jury selection112 notwithstanding the diverse demographic factors impinging on the process of voir dire.113 Simi larly, race contaminates jury deliberation in spite of the constitu- Jury nullification occurs when a jury acquits a defendant who it believes is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. In finding the defendant not guilty, the jury refuses to be bound by the facts of the case or the judge's instructions regarding the law. In stead, the jury votes its conscience. For the white defender of black lynching, the criminal jury trial provides a forum for citizen political participation aimed at curing the problem of white political, social, and economic disenfranchise ment. ns Deployed as an "audience-based theory of argument , "116 nullifi,cation rhetoric imbues the racialized speech found in opening and closing statements, direct and cross examinations, and even ob jections. The rhetoric vocalizes the political astonishment111 of the white community toward lynching prosecutions. For defenders of that community, the ethical task is to"'distinguish between what can be said and what ca .ml ot be said"118 in the service of racial supremacy._ The evidence of community astonishment apparent in jury nulli fication points to an entrenched sociolegal consciousness of racial hierarchy. Demonstrated in public through the media 119 and in pri vate through talk of conspiracy or hoax, 120 hierarchy-instilled racial consciousness molds the sociolegal reality of the criminal law. The rhetorical stratagems of prosecution and defense teams reflect that reality .121 The constitution of the racialized self and racial commu- Pilcher remarks that:
[C]riminal prosecution serves a broadly educational function as well as an individually punitive one: public views of blameworthiness are significantly influenced by what is prosecuted, just as what is criminalized is influenced by public disapproval. Provided the enforced norm is perceived as morally legitimate, and the violator thus blameworthy, the norm is intemaliz�d and accrues power as a socializing force. Criminal enforcement in the absence of socialization of the norm, however, can have the opposite effect; if the public would not collectively react to violation of the norm with condemnation then the nity mirrors the same reality.122 Fo rged from the hierarchical ten sion of racial status domination and subordination, both the self and community suffer from the deformities of negation.
B. Vi ctim Denigration
The racialized defense of victim denigration rests on the nega tion of racial identity in law and culture.123 Negation fragments ra cial identity124 and scatters . deformed images throughout the criminal process.125 CriiniD. al ' defense lawyers employ this imagery in the "elaboration of diff erence. "126 Racial diff erence establishes the predic�te for the segregation of the white self and the black other. Ly nching defenders seek to enforce racial segregation by af firming the status of the white lawbreaker and demeaning the body of the black victim.12 1 particular prohibition has no distinctive social power. This, in tum, fosters the dimin . ished respect for the law-. ... This tension causes problems for theory and contradictory tendencies in practice."). The denigration defense centers on the racially subordinate sta tus of black victims.12s Affirmin g this unequal status renews long standing claims of moral, physical, mental, and genetic inferiority. The claims provide the historical rationale not only for lynching, but also for eugenic segregation and sexual sterilization.129 They also supply the basis for assigning qualities of bad or immoral char acter to black victims.
See
To lynching defenders, black victims possess immoral character. Infirmities of character render such victims undeserving of privacy or dignity. The deterioration of victim-specific privacy interests at tends the steady collapse of the boundary line separating public from private realms in law and liberal theory. Calling upon the state for juridical vindication hastens that collapse.130 State action, in a significant sense, propels the victim of private violence into a public role.
Acting in concert with the state, criminal defense lawyers frame the identity of victims in the public sphere of the courtroom. rative inclusion and exclusion. Bandes describes narrative judgment as "unavoidably normative" and "value-laden."136 In her view, the issue "is always which narratives we should privilege and which we should marginalize or even silence."137 Victim denigration statements privilege narratives of white in nocence and resistance antagonistic to black identity and the corol lary value of black self-esteem.138 The narratives reproduce racial hierarchies of moral worth, emphasizing the role of black depravity even at death. Denigration rhetoric of this kind ventures to estab lish an "empathetic link"139 between white lawbreakers and white jurors, thereby coloring the judgment of culpability.140 In the same way, the diminished capacity rhetoric of racial delusion seeks out the empathetic ratification of segregated community.
C. Diminished Capacity
The racialized defense of diminished capacity combines commit ment, community, and delusion to free white lawbreakers of moral and criminal culpability. Freedom follows from the commitment to segregated community. Heralded in the case of lynching, that com-
Bandes adds:
Once we acknowledge the instrumental, political nature of legal narrative, we can enter the difficult discussions of why marginalization of some narratives occurs, how to sepa rate the wrongly excluded narratives from those that ought to be excluded, how to in clude the wrongly marginalized narratives in legal discourse, and how to ensure that they are actually heard.
Bandes, supra note 132, at 387-88 (footnotes omitted).
137. Id. at 409. Death penalty abolitionists, for example, urge the silencing of victim impact narratives on the ground that they "incline the sentencer in favor of death, thus im pugning the reliability of the jury's decision as an objective benchmark of the evolving stan More often, the difficulty for the trier of fact is in making the empathetic link with the defendant, in seeing the defendant's shared humanity. In either situation, though, the real importance of empathy lies in its countemarrative aspect -it enables the trier of fact to imagine himself in the place of another. mitment triggers the diminished capacity defense. Proponents of the defense contend that the extreme nature of white commitment to community-wide racial supremacy induces a state of mind bor dering on delusion. Thus misguided, white lawbreakers perform acts of racial violence without individual or collective remorse.
Like jury nullification and victim denigration, the defense of di minished capacity illustrates the pivotal role of counsel in perpetu ating racial violence. The defense directs counsel to put the white lawbreaker's state of mind in legal controversy. It is counsel's duty to assert client claims of diminished capacity and incompetency, whether attributable to emotional disturbance or to insanity.141 The claim of racial delusion satisfies that duty. 1 4 2 Excusing white lawbreakers from liability on the ground of delusion-inducing racial emotion dilutes the moral force of criminal defense advocacy. Emotion is fundamental to this dilution.143 The diminished capacity defense depicts white lawbreakers caught up in the emotion of populist resistance.144 Discarding the image of white savagery, the defense offers the alternative impression of white innocence, an innocence filled with a commitment to commu nity solidarity. Comparable to duress,145 this commitment to soli darity brings to bear elements of psychological and physical coercion upon individuals enmeshed in the culture of white supremacy,146 recasting violence as "prejudiced irrationality."147
The image of the community-minded white innocent evokes race and the racial body. Tami Spry speaks of "the body that is visible as a cultural symbol."14s The diminished capacity defense puts forward the black body as a cultural obj ect. According to this defense, the killin g of the black body, indeed the act of lynching itself, constitutes an act of empowerment, an act of human agency vital to the identity construction of the white self and the white community. The defense prevails despite its intimation of social pathology.149
The modern jurisprudence of the criminal law supports the claim of racial violence as pathology.150 In its current rendition, the claim suggests that the presence of racially coercive151 pathology negates the free will152 and responsibility153 of the white law breaker.154 This reading, however, flips the standard legal dichot omy of agent-victim or perpetrator-victim on its head.155 Kathryn Abrams explains that "the categories of perpetrator and victim are understood to be simple and unitary: the perpetrator enj oys full agency, and the victim either lacks as a categorical matter, or loses through the experience of discrimination, virtually all capacity for self-direction."156 Ye t, under the racial delusion defense of agent as-victim, it is the white perpetrator who lacks the cognitive capac ity for independent moral direction and the black victim who invites racial retribution. Discordantly, in a manner akin to disability and incompetence, this cognitive impairment actually warrants greater lawyer solicitousness157 precisely because it renders moral con science and punishment irrelevant . 15 8 149. Kathryn Abrams cites a similar tension experienced by women's defense lawyers attempting to navigate "between the need to defend battered women who kill (often through the use of defenses such as 'learned helplessness') and the need for battered women, and women as a group, to project an image reflecting some capacity for agency." Kathryn Deriving a lynching defense from the social-psychology of racial delusion privatizes the social issue of racism. Privatization ignores the social undercurrents of hate crime in America.15 9 The move from the public to the private sphere, and the corresponding shift from moral evil to scientific pathology, allows the legal profession to evade responsibility for its complicity in maintaining racial violence.
III. LYNCHING ETHICS
Lynching ethics describes the normative system that criminal lawyers employ to justify the racialized defenses of jury nullifica tion, victim denigration, and diminished capacity. Reassembled here from modern and postmodern conceptions of criminal defense representation, that value system sacrifices collective moral deliber ation as a regulative ideaP6° to the zealous advancement of individ ual freedom.161 Indeed, the systematic objective of criminal defense advocacy is to preserve individual client freedom. Conven tionally, freedom comprises both positive and negative rights. Ye t, for the criminal defendant, negative rights acquire principal empha sis in erecting a bulwark against state encroachment upon political and civil liberties.
To ensure the preservation of ordered liberties, defense attor neys seek to establish more stringent standards of state conduct in criminal cases.162 To that end, they espouse the principles of liberal legalism and the rhetoric of rights.163 The presumption of inno- The most common rationalization given for the higher and stricter standards and rules in criminal cases is the greater severity of its sanctions (punishments) as well as its social consequences (stigma, disrepute). Another common rationalization is the greater need in criminal cases for protection of the individual against the massive forces and resources of the state. cence, the right to remain silent, and the burden of state proof be yond a reasonable doubt 1 64 all testify to the strength of liberalism in asserting private rights against the state and its penal incursions.
Grasping the injunction of zealous criminal defense advocacy requires engagement with liberal theory, particularly its vision of state power, corruption, and malice. Consistent with the tradition of liberal political theory, David Luban attributes state power, and its abuse, to advantages in police and prosecutorial resources, crimi nal procedure, political legitimacy, and bargaining position. 165 Based on this balance of state advantages, Luban recommends the professional norm of zealous advocacy to criminal defense law yers.166 Nonetheless, suspicious of presumptive absolutes, he warns that this role-derived norm is rebuttable. 167 Luban's broadly framed version of the zealous advocacy defense contrasts sharply with William Simon's narrowly tailored formula tion. 168 Simon rejects the categorical use of zealous advocacy in the criminal sphere, endorsing only the selective use of aggressive de fense tactics when warranted by substantive justice objections to unjustly harsh or discriminatory punishment, especially if traceable to political disenfranchisement.169 That categorical rejection evinces a fundamental disagreement over the meaning and require ment of deception in criminal defense advocacy. For Luban, crimi nal defense advocacy necessitates deceptive defense tactics. 11o For Simon, deception imperils the moral self-conception of defense law yers and, consequently, risks alienation and loss of moral integration. 171 Deception is central to the ideology and practice of racialized defenses. Although generally absent from accounts of the motiva tions of criminal defense lawyers,172 deception permeates the advo-cacy function, distorting client identity and condemning the search for truth, even the contingent truth realized in particularized con texts.173 Both modem and postmodern accounts of crimin�l de fense practice renounce the search for truth. Uninterested in the moral commitments accompanying fragmentary moments of histor ical truth, the accounts find relevance only in the machinery of ad versarial justice.
A. The Modernist Justification
The modernist justification of racialized defenses hinges on law yer commitment to the institutional values of the adversarial sys tem. Performing within this system, criminal defense lawyers internalize adversarial norms, meanings, and roles.174 Norm intemalization, Allan Gibbard explafus, "involves tendencies to ward action and emotion, tendencies that are coordinated with the tendencies of others in ways that constitute matched adaptations, or are the results of matched adaptations."175
Consider the norm of role-differentiated morality.176 Applied to the matched prosecution-defense adaptations of the adversarial system, role-based differentiation severs professional morality from personal and community morality, enabling the criminal defense lawyer to serve in the guise of Monroe Fr eedman's "champion against a hostile world."177 Rooted in the Sixth Amendment notion is the answer contained in race-neutral proclamations emanating from the politics of racial "nonrecognition. " 1 8 7
This same rhetorical politics pronounces jury nullification, vic tim denigration, and diminished capacity as expressions of private preferences outside the public reach of juridical sanction. Constru ing racialized defenses as private litigant preferences revitalizes the public-private distinction in law and lawyering.1ss The reinstantia tion of that dichotomy encases criminal defense advocacy in the lib eral rhetoric of privacy1 8 9 and autonomy.190 Privacy talk shields racialized advocacy from ethical regulation, effectively granting at torneys and their clients immunity from public scrutiny.
No concession of immunity should go unqualified. To the extent that racialized defenses blend private choice and state enforcement, they come within the meaning of state action.191 In this way, the defenses expose lawyers and clients to potential liability under anti discrimination laws as well as relevant disciplinary codes. The treatment of nullifi cation, denigration, and diminished capacity ver dicts as the reasoned, deliberative products of a democratic commu nity fails to insulate lawyers against such liability. Under the racialized defenses of jury nullifi cation, victim deni gration, and diminished capacity, the "best argument" gains credence through white community acceptance. Rendering the moral quality of legal argument contingent on local commullity ap probation trivializes larger ethical and normative considerations.199
Lawyering affords no escape from the political and community commitments of normative judgment. Even when the reduction of professional service to "technical assistance" tends "to reduce moral concerns to matters of individual taste, if not idiosyn cracy,"2 00 it leaves the politics of normativity2 0 1 in advocacy to col lective discernment. 443, 452 (1995) (noting that pragmatists' "appeal to experience was not a value neutral appeal: the implications of the experience appealed to by individual pragmatists was shaped by their own value orientation"). Gibbard observes: Accepting a norm is something that we do primarily in the context of nonnative discus sion, actual and imaginary. We take positions, and thereby expose ourselves to demands for consistency. Nonnative discussion of a situation influences action and emotion in like situations. It is then that we can speak of norms as governing action and emotion, and it is through this governance that nonnative discussion serves to coordinate. Inter nalizing a norm is likewise a matter of coordinating propensities, but the propensities are of a different kind: they work independently of nonnative discussion. GIBBARD, supra note 174, at 75. 208. See Michael E. Tigar, Defending, 74 TEXAS L. REv. 101, 109 (1995) . Tigar notes: In the courtroom arena, there is a symbolic equality of defense and prosecution. We understand that in fact the balance of resources almost always tips in favor of the gov ernment, and this is particularly so in high-profile cases where high officials have an nounced an intention to take the defendants' lives. The defendant is not given a choice whether to participate in the unequal contest. The inequality is just another device of the system-called-justice. The lawyer's job is to expose the device, deploying the signs of justice against the signs of system-called-justice. The signs of justice include empowering the jury, calling on the tribunal to respect its oath, exposing contradiction -bringing out solid reasons why the judge and jurors should go beneath the surface of things. 
KRONMAN, THE LoST LAWYER: FAIUNG IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
professionalism213 and regulation214 lapse into repose. The silence of that repose is attributable to the liberalism-based exclusion of public moral pronouncement215 from the lawyer-client relationship. Liberalism offers a private, contractarian basis for the lawyer-client relationship that emphasizes the priority of technique, procedure, and perspectivelessness.216
Envisioning the lawyer-client relationship as a private, contrac tual order permits the exploration of certain background regulatory norms,211 such as reciprocity.21 s The norm of reciprocity treats the racialized defenses of jury nullification, victim denigration, and di minished capacity as the efficient, transactional product of lawyer client value consensus. Rather than assail the defenses for ineffi ciency,21 9 citing for example the external costs to character and community, the ethic of race-conscious responsibility attacks the premise of private, moral consensus as overbroad. On this view, reciprocity proves counterfactual and moral dialogue degenerates into an expedient maneuver. The normative embrace of virtue, citi zenship, multi-racial community, and spirituality signals the re demptive search of moral activism.
A. Vir tue
The norm of virtue strengthens the moral content of the ethic of race-conscious responsibility through legal reasoning and prac- REv. 2055 REv. , 2063 . Pildes contends that the norms of reciprocity contain a specifi c or local strand which "sustains ongoing relationships between specifi c parties ... in direct, one to-one interactions ... [as well as a generalized strand which] is a more global predisposition to be motivated by norms of reciprocity and cooperation even when acting in new settings or with new agents outside some previously established relationship." Id. at 2064 (footnote omitted).
219. See David Chamy, Illusions of a Sp ontaneous Order: "Norms" in Contractual Rela tionships, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1841, 1848-52 (1996) (claiming that inefficient norms "favor the members of concentrated interest groups, at the expense of more diffuse members"). Competence alone, however, furnishes no moral assurance of ad vancing a greater social good.24° Candor at least proffers an "open ness to others"24 1 essential to the creation of a racially diverse community.242
B. Citizenship
The norm of citizenship contributes a transformative notion of community obligation to t h e ethic of race-conscious responsibility.
Although political, the norm betrays doubts about the suitability of lawyers' political judgments.243 The political character of the norm instead pertains to the meaning of lawyer community participation in matters of democratic citizenship that cut across racial lines.
The norm of citizenship encourages lawyer crosscutting commu nity participation in an effort t� achieve a fuller individual sense of collective, multiracial identity. Unlike David Abraham's "complete citizen,"244 the lawyer-citizen seeks more than a_ "relatively unfet tered" sense of community membership.and self-go v emance.245 In deed, he seeks the richness of racially diverse citizenship, not merely a sta t e of relative self-suffi ciency.246
[W]e must widen our perspective from a focus on particular acts, whether the acts are conceived in tenns of their agent's motives or their effects on others. We must include the agent's general dispositions, vices, and' virtues-in a word, his or her character. In focusing on character and its development, we see how we are made to do what we do, and, conversely, how what we do and why we do it make us who we are. Most impor tantly, we learn who we want to be. Atkinson, supra note 182, at 217 (footnotes omitted).
240. John DiPippa observes that the loss of moral community deprives a lawyer of the moral assurance that his work offers morally efficacious service. See The concept of citizenship enlivening the lawyer-citizen ideal reaches beyond the private, self-identity of the sovereign subj ect to hold up a public, racially integrated version of the self. Frederick Dolan finds the self "constituted through a plurality of judgments and narratives of others."247 For Dolan, this public self is a product of the "plural and variable character of human interaction, espe cially symbolic or discursive interaction."248 Even when that inter action embroils the dichotomies of racial hierarchy, this public self may acquire what Dolan describes as "a distinctive, coherent, and stable identity."249 According to this analysis, identity evolves through language and intersubj ective action. The presence of an alternative, public self demonstrates the "linguistic and interpretive character of identity."250
The public, self-identity of the lawyer-citizen gives rise to broad community obligations in criminal defense practice. Those obliga tions include the building and strengthening of interracial commu nities.251 Although the communitarian account of race and community is underdeveloped,252 its component elements of social deliberation and public-private partnership show transformative potential.253
C. Race Consciousness
The norm of race consciousness forms the core of the ethic of race-conscious responsibility. This norm stands against the vio lently contested history of race consciousness in American The upshot of this contest finds articulation in the "racial rule of differentiation."255 While subordination often accompanies the ap plication of the rule of diff erentiation, diff erentiation itself does not necessarily imply subordination. Nor does the dissonance of racial identity carry such an implication.
The norm of race consciousness hinges on a commitment to multiracial community that honors diff erentiation and diversity as integral parts of collective dialogue. That commitment urges the exploration of hate speech regulation,256 especially when commu nity sentiment veers toward violence. The interpretive and physical violence embodied in the racialized defenses of jury nullification, victim denigration, and diminished capacity extends the instant realm of hate speech regulation to the rhetoric of the courtroom.
At the outset, it is important to distinguish the regulation of law yers' courtroom speech from restrictions on lawyers' extra-judicial statements.257 In contrast to the regulation of extra-judicial com ment, the regulation of courtroom speech instigates broad fear of constitutional intrusion.258 Allaying this fear requires a race conscious defense of state intervention in the private and public ex ercise of speech rights.259
In this light, consider Owen Fiss's recent defense of state ac tion.260 Fiss conceives of the "state as parliamentarian," contending that the First Amendment principle of democratic self-governance "does not protect merely choice by citizens, but rather choice made with adequate information and under suitable conditions of refiec tion."261 To the extent that racialized defenses constitute an unin formed and unreflective hate-speech-inspired choice of lawyer and client citizens, the justification for governmental regulation gathers force.262
Nevertheless, some may object that application of the rule of racial differentiation to regulate hate speech constitutes an " 'inva sive preference.' "263 Pointing to the lawyer-client relationship, Luban defines an invasive preference as "an individual preference for an option that someone else has excluded as a matter of right."264 He finds evidence of invasive preference when a lawyer overrides the stated preference of a client. Override, Cathy Mans field suggests, may consist of the "act of taking utilitarian control of a client's story by placing legal construct upon it. "265 Construed as an act of client domination, utilitarian control may arise in other substantive law areas outside of the criminal law.266 Whatever the substantive law at stake, the crux of hate speech regulation con cerns securing voluntary lawyer-client agreement to refrain from harmful, racialized rhetoric. The next section examines the possi bility of reaching such agreement through shared spirituality.
to engage. In favoring the speech rights of blacks in this way, the state is not making a judgment about the merit -constitutional or other -of the views each side is likely to express, through "fighting words" or otherwise, but only that this sector of the commu nity must be heard from more fully if the public is to make an informed choice about an entire range of issues on the public agenda, from affi rmative action, to education, to welfare policy. The state is acting as a parliamentarian trying to end a pattern of behav ior that silences one group and thus distorts or skews public debate. The state is not trying to usurp the public's right of collective self-determination, but rather to enhance the public's capacity to properly exercise that right.
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D. Spirituality
The norm of spirituality completes the ethic of race-conscious responsibility. Contemporary writing on ethics evinces a tum to spirituality in law and the legal profession.267 A similar shift is visi ble in the medical profession. 268 In jurisprudence, however, the shift marks a departure from formalism and instrumentalism prompted by the search for values absent from or external to law.269
Images of spirituality in law may be traced to "the prophetic vision of justice" in American legal culture.2 1 0 The desire for spiri tual fulfillment fills that vision, moving from the ground up out of the drive for self-alteration and context-transcendence in the pur suit of human fiourishing,2 1 1 a pursuit basic to the human character.
Tr anscendence involves more than the self. At bottom, spiritu ality is tied to the notion of communion and community-building.2 1 2 Without communion with others, the investigation of alternative types of relationships that neither devalue nor exclude race makes no progress. Indeed, the very concept of personhood is contingent on the flourishing of interracial community. 273 The overarching morality of community resides in the general obligation to reconcile competing visions of the common good. This obligation requires lawyers and clients to combat moral disas sociation274 and to eschew narrow self-interest in advocacy. Only a reconstructive morality reconciling individual rights and social re sponsibilities satisfies that obligation.2 1s
Drawn from the jurisprudence of critical race theory,276 the re constructive ethic of race-conscious responsibility reasserts the role of lawyers as custodians of community.277 This custodial responsi bility requires entry into spiritual dialogue with clients and commu nities to establish respect for conscience in opposing racial animus. 278 Fashioned from an ethic of care279 increasingly cele brated in ethics regimes,28° spiritual dialogue brings the potential for compassion281 and empathy into the play of advocacy. Doubt less forestallin g the conversion of caring into coercion or paternal ism poses challe n ges.282 Institutionalizing the ethic of care in state juridical structures presents even greater challenges.283 Each of these four obj ections deserves more elaborate treat ment than is available in this brief article. Nonetheless, the rough contours of a suitable response may be sketched here. Protests re garding feared impediments on a criminal defendant's freedom of choice in devising a defense strategy, however well intentioned, must concede that client freedom is not ordinarily unfettered. De fensive strategy effectively rests on the discretionary judgments of lawyer counsel. The content of that counsel is subj ect to greater regulation from statutory code and court sanction than from client ministration.
Moreover, disquiet over the hindering of a criminal defendant's right to trial, while legitimate, seems exaggerated. The proposed ethic does nothing to disturb a criminal defendant's Sixth Amend ment right to a jury trial. Rather, the ethic limits the tactics obtain able at trial. Those tactics already fall under the constraining ethical supervision and evidentiary governance of courts.
Further, worry about the danger of lawyer bad faith in counsel ing and negotiation, albeit well placed, appears prematbre. No procurable evidence, empirical or anecdotal, implies bad faith.
Neither does the analogy to plea bargaining, and its associated mis conduct, offer a basis for such a presumption. 
